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1 
Explaining the Transparency of Local Government Websites 
through a Political Market Framework 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on government transparency by addressing the question 
of what drives the differences in local government levels of transparency. Our main objective is 
to ascertain whether transparency is mainly driven by the leadership, capacity and other political 
traits of the local governments themselves – “supply-side determinants” – or, rather, if it hinges 
on social, cultural and/or other local community factors (“demand-side” determinants). We test 
the hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework using the results of the Municipal 
Transparency Index which is based on the information disclosed in the local governments’ 
official websites and was applied to all Portuguese municipalities for the first time in 2013. Our 
findings indicate that municipalities with less financial autonomy, run by male mayors, with a 
larger number of consecutive terms in office, and larger margins of victory in local elections 
display lower levels of transparency. On the demand-side, the unemployment rate and the 
average age of the municipal population emerge as the best predictors and are both negatively 
associated with transparency. 
Keywords 
Access to information; government websites: local governance; municipalities; transparency 
indexes. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Transparency is generally regarded as a key element of good governance (TI, 2015). The topic 
has been widely discussed in recent literature and relates to many other concepts such as open 
government and freedom of information. For the purpose of this research, we adopt a simple – 
and perhaps slightly more constrained than usual – operational definition of transparency: it 
corresponds to “the online publicity of all the acts of government and their representatives to 
provide civil society with relevant information in a complete, timely, and accessible manner” 
(i.e. in the municipalities’ official websites) (da Cruz et al., 2016). 
Our definition draws on the Digital Government literature highlighting the role of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) in promoting equal and sustained public access to 
government information (Meijer, 2003; Jaeger & Bertot, 2010), enhancing accountability and 
trust in government (Pina, Torres, & Royo, 2007), and discouraging maladministration and 
corruption (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010). The focus on local government official websites to 
assess transparency can be justified by the fact that they are arguably the most easily accessible, 
credible and durable form of internet-enabled technology to provide government information in 
a timely manner. 
Transparency enables accountability by empowering citizens, the media, monitoring bodies and 
other stakeholders to find, process, and reuse government data to generate meaningful 
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information and knowledge (Robinson et al., 2009; Murillo, 2015). For this reason, it is 
desirable that timely information on political representatives, decision-making processes and 
outcomes is made available to citizens. Yet, transparency levels are often substandard in public 
or governmental bodies. Depending on the particular contexts and jurisdictions, sharing 
information about the decision-making processes (and the decision-makers themselves) may be 
a longstanding tradition or a brand new concern. Particularly, at the local level, transparency 
practices vary substantially from one municipality to another (e.g. see TpC, 2010; TIE, 2014; 
TIS, 2014). 
In spite of the latest efforts, current empirical research still does not provide decisive answers on 
the reasons behind these fluctuations in levels of transparency. To a great extent, this gap in the 
literature has persisted due to the lack of reliable and operational measures of transparency 
(Hollyer, Rosendorff & Vreeland, 2014; Piotrowski & Bertelli, 2010). However, several 
attempts to develop assessment models have been deployed in recent years. Most notably, many 
of Transparency International’s (TI) national chapters have been trying to develop local 
government transparency indexes for their own countries (some more successfully than others). 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by attempting to provide an answer to the following 
research question: “what drives transparency in local government?” Evidently, this main 
interrogation leads to many others that we will address in a structured way. Our main objective 
is to discern whether transparency is mainly driven by the leadership, capacity and/or other 
political traits of the local leaders and local governments themselves (“supply-side 
determinants”) or, rather, contingent upon social, cultural and/or other local 
community/population features (“demand-side” determinants). To accomplish this we use the 
results of the recently developed Municipal Transparency Index (MTI) which was applied to all 
308 Portuguese municipalities for the first time in 2013. 
It should be noted at the outset that the MTI adopts (and measures) the abovementioned 
definition of transparency, not a more comprehensive notion of “local government 
transparency” that may go beyond the simple disclosure of information online (Meijer, Hart & 
Worthy, 2015). The selection of indicators and their respective weights followed a participatory 
approach that can be universally replicated. But the MTI model and scores used in this research 
are unique to the Portuguese local government context and reflect the intrinsic legitimacy of the 
modelling process. In more general terms, a similar process could be developed in other 
countries to produce different sets of indicators and weights that would be regarded as relevant 
by the country’s legitimate stakeholders. 
The empirical findings indicate that (in Portugal) transparency seems to be primarily driven by 
endogenous factors of local governments and not so much the result of societal calls for 
increased openness or more information. The number of consecutive terms served by an 
incumbent mayor and the lower levels of municipal financial autonomy appear consistently as 
the most detrimental factors to transparency. The gender of the mayor also depicts a significant 
and robust association, with municipalities led by women displaying significantly higher levels 
of transparency. Societal factors seem to be less important drivers of transparency, although 
municipalities with higher unemployment levels and proportion of elderly population are 
consistently associated with lower levels of transparency.    
The following section presents a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of 
transparency at the local government level. In the third and fourth sections we illustrate the 
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theoretical arguments behind the “supply” and “demand” types of determinants, respectively. 
The fifth section comprises the data, methods and research findings. Finally, the sixth section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Brief review of the literature 
Access to information is now accepted as a fundamental right protected by national 
Constitutions in many democratic countries, an ethical value and priority for Public 
Administration (Cooper, 2004), and a precondition for public participation, scrutiny, and 
accountability (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007). Indeed, as TI puts it, “[t]ransparency 
empowers citizens to participate in and follow up on local governments’ activities. If the actors 
of the local governance system are open in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, 
budgets, processes, actions and results, corruption is harder to hide. Transparency is a 
precondition for integrity and accountability” (TI, 2015). Together with other key principles and 
values, transparency is currently seen as a crucial pillar of good governance. 
Part of the challenge to open government policies involves matching data and information 
requirements and needs of citizens and businesses to data made available by public 
organizations. From a supply-side perspective, Wong and Welch (2004) define the concept of 
open government as the extent to which public organizations reveal information about their 
operations, procedures, and decision-making processes. From the demand side, Armstrong 
(2005) describes transparency as the ‘unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable 
information on decisions and performance in the public sector’. Open government initiatives 
should therefore adopt a citizen-centered or user’s perspective in order to generate public value 
(Harrison et al., 2012; Janssen et al., 2012). No less important is the role played by elected 
officials and public managers in the implementation of measures to promote transparency at all 
levels of government. The prevalence of a culture of transparency in the public sector is largely 
dependent on the responsiveness of these actors to the demand for information by citizens and 
businesses as well as their affirmative steps to make information about government affairs 
public without waiting for specific requests, for example, through the use of ICTs (i.e. proactive 
disclosure). Matching supply and demand transforms the basic tenets of open government 
policies – transparency, participation and collaboration – into means to achieve desirable ends 
by contributing to the (co-)creation of public value by public and private actors. Harrison et al. 
(2012) show how this can be accomplished through a public value assessment tool employed to 
evaluate the substantive benefits of open government initiatives. 
Due to the aforementioned absence of suitable tools to assess the wider transparency practices 
of (local) governments, the few studies on the determinants of transparency focus mainly on 
financial issues. The reason behind this bias is fairly straightforward: it is easier to 
operationalize the concept of financial transparency. Bolívar et al. (2013) carried out a meta-
analysis of this literature and concluded that factors such as the “financial condition” of 
governments systematically affect financial transparency levels. Nevertheless, these authors 
point out that the context in which the research is carried out also influences the findings 
considerably. 
More recently, an increasing number of authors have been using the indexes developed by the 
TI movement to analyze the associations with several socio-economic variables and thus 
explore the determinants of transparency (especially for the case of Spain). Some studies 
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employ partial indexes (focusing on specific dimensions of transparency, usually, financial 
transparency) as the dependent variables of their multivariate regression models (e.g. Guillamón 
et al., 2011; Vicente et al., 2013). Despite the theoretical limitations of the existing assessment 
models (for a critical discussion, see da Cruz and Marques, 2013 and 2014 and da Cruz et al., 
2016), other authors use the overall transparency indexes which aggregate the scores obtained 
for each dimension of transparency (e.g. Albalate del Sol, 2013). 
Using a different measure of transparency based on perceptions (survey data), Piotrowski and 
Van Ryzin (2007) and Piotrowski and Bertelli (2010) also attempt to uncover the determinants 
of local government transparency. Variables connected with civic engagement emerge from this 
research as being quite relevant for greater governmental transparency. Closely related to the 
definition of transparency adopted in the current paper and to the MTI assessment (please see 
section 4.1.), Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2010) address the determining factors of municipal E-
government. These authors conclude that issues such as administrative and financial capacity, 
ideology and the size of the municipality may affect the development and dynamism of E-
government. 
Recent work by Yavuz and Welch (2014) employs data from a national survey of 850 managers 
from planning, finance, and police departments in 500 cities to examine the determinants of 
transparency and interactivity features of government websites. The authors find that website 
openness defined as a function of transparency and interactivity is positively related to increased 
frequency of citizen participation in agency decision-making, technical capacity, lower 
organizational control, and higher perceived usefulness of website technology.  
Our operational definition of transparency as “the online publicity of all the acts of government 
and their representatives to provide civil society with relevant information in a complete, timely, 
and accessible manner” entails some limitations. First, the definition focuses on information 
available online, therefore potentially discriminating against digitally disadvantaged citizens. 
Second, despite the focus on “complete, timely, and easily accessible” information, the data 
collected for the MTI does not allow us to control for levels of accessibility. In other words, and 
similarly to other indexes present in the literature, the MTI model can only guarantee that the 
information included in its calculation is present on the official websites and not that it is easily 
accessible and/or of high quality. Despite these limitations, we are confident that this type of 
information has the potential to disclose private interests which can conflict with the collective 
interest and make actors accountable for decisions and actions taken or omitted, and the facts 
that informed them (da Cruz et al., 2016). 
The following section expands this initial approach to the empirical literature to analyze specific 
determinants of local government transparency. The empirical evidence collected from these 
references is used to formulate our research hypotheses. 
 
3. A political market framework for transparency 
We develop and apply a political market framework to examine how levels of transparency are 
shaped by the profile of the mayors and local government executives on the supply-side and the 
attributes of local organizations, interests and preferences in a community on the demand-side. 
The political market framework has been applied to the study of environmental policies 
(Keohane et al., 1998) and land use management decisions (Feiock et al., 2008; Lubell et al., 
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2009), but it is the first time it is used to analyze local government transparency. The framework 
argues that not only local government officials and institutions “choose” to provide a specific 
level of transparency in each jurisdiction, but also that the influence of citizens and interest 
groups affects the varying levels of transparency displayed across local governments. In other 
words, understanding the determinants of local government transparency requires not only 
hypotheses concerning the supply of transparency by local officials, but also hypotheses 
concerning the demand pressures by societal actors.  
 
3.1. Supply-side determinants 
The mayor’s personal traits and the composition of the elected executive may determine the 
preferences of local officials regarding transparency issues and ultimately affect the decision 
and/or processes of providing online information to local constituencies. This section discusses 
the supply-side hypotheses regarding the determinants of local government transparency. 
 
3.1.1. Profile of the head of the executive 
The profile of the municipal executive (elected representatives in the executive branch of local 
government) has a direct bearing on transparency. Depending on the actual political system – 
for example, strong mayor or weak mayor, mayor-council or council-manager, among many 
other possible configurations – the profile of the mayor, in particular, may be especially relevant 
for the overall attitude of the local government towards transparency. Therefore, the political 
profile argument captures the level of commitment and willingness of mayors to support 
transparency based on personal characteristics. Mayors that value citizen voice and display 
concerns for the public interest, participation and social equity are also expected to devote more 
time and efforts into making transparency one of their priorities (Yang & Callahan, 2007; 
Handley & Howell-Moroney, 2010).  
Political leadership is crucial in the modernization of local governance (Bochel & Bochel, 
2010). Piotrowski & Van Ryzin (2007) find that older persons are more likely to support 
transparency practices, even if their results show that they are less likely to obtain government 
documents, perhaps due to the fact that these are increasingly being made available online. In 
this respect, higher level officials of a younger age may be more willing to embrace technology-
based transparency as a local government policy. Since our measure of transparency relies on 
digital information disclosure, we expected that younger mayors will be more supportive of 
higher levels of transparency. In a similar vein, Dreher et al. (2009) contend that education and 
professional experience are important factors in the enactment of political initiatives. Based on a 
theoretical argument developed by Robert Putnam (1977), it is possible that the level of formal 
education and the type of training background frames the individual approach to participation. 
This argument about political participation can be extended to suggest that a higher level of 
formal education may also drive the demand for higher levels of transparency. 
Finally, more open and cooperative leadership styles may also be related to gender. Eagly and 
John (1990) find that women are more inclined to adopt a participatory type of leadership. The 
argument is that their approach and/or social skills may influence their attitude as managers and 
point to a leadership style that is both more democratic and more acceptant of suggestions by 
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their peers and collaborators. In contrast, men tend to be more prone to choose a direct, 
autocratic type of leadership and will be less willing to accept participation. The only empirical 
work that tests the relationship between the mayor’s gender and local government transparency 
is Sjöberg’s 2010 study of 349 Chilean municipalities (Sjöberg, 2010). The author only finds 
weak evidence to support the hypothesis that female mayors are more committed to 
transparency than their male counterparts. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) draw similar 
findings regarding “safety information”. Based on these arguments, we develop a set of 
hypotheses related to the profile of the mayor: 
H1: Municipalities headed by younger mayors are more likely to present higher levels of 
transparency 
H2: Municipalities led by mayors with higher education display higher levels of transparency 
H3: Municipalities with female mayors display higher levels of transparency 
 
3.1.2. Profile of the municipal executive 
Intense electoral competition stimulates citizen involvement and political debate that contribute 
to pluralism and the vitality of democracy. Comparative empirical work conducted at the 
national level indicates free and fair elections have a positive effect on budgetary transparency 
(Wehner & De Renzio, 2013; Harrison & Sayogo, 2014). When political competition is absent 
or diminished in any way, transparency is likely to be thwarted due to the lack of internal 
political pressure to introduce changes in the status quo.  
If the local executive has a comfortable majority, there will be less pressure to interact with 
citizen voters, search for legitimacy or seek “the consent of the governed” (Thomas, 2010). 
More homogeneous communities characterized by lower levels of political conflict will demand 
less commitment to democratic governance (Oliver, 2001). Gandia and Archidona (2008) test 
the political competition hypothesis on website information disclosure by 130 municipalities in 
Spain. In order to quantify the information on city council web sites, the authors design a 
Disclosure Index (DI) which takes into account the content, navigability and presentation of the 
web sites. They find a positive relationship between the degree of competition and the levels of 
information disclosure measured by their DI. A similar study by Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero 
(2012) finds the same effect for the levels of budget transparency. 
In cities with competitive political environments the local executive may feel the need to 
support transparency in order to increase credibility, foster mobilization, understand and address 
citizen concerns, and engage the community in the executive’s policy proposals. Nevertheless, 
John and Cole (1999) argue that executive majorities allow local officials to experiment with 
participatory tools, something that executives facing tough electoral competition may wish to 
avoid due to the lack of stability and the added uncertainty that engaging with new tools brings 
about. 
Political ideology may also be related to transparency issues. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) 
find that individuals self-identifying as liberals are more likely to support higher government 
transparency than individuals of a more conservative political ideology. Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Welch (2012) analyze transparency in Dutch municipalities and find that decision-making 
transparency is connected with political influence and that a stronger presence of left-wing 
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parties in the local council is associated with more transparent local government. In his study of 
municipal transparency in Spain, Albalate del Sol (2013) finds a negative association between 
partisanship and transparency for both left-wing and right-wing executive majorities as opposed 
to coalition executives. However, the author also finds a positive relationship between left-wing 
mayors and higher levels of transparency.  
In addition to political will, administrative capacity can also be influential in the implementation 
of transparency initiatives. Prior work has found that the perceived technical capacity of the 
organization and having a designated person responsible for website management are both 
predicting factors of website openness (Yavuz & Welch, 2014). The reasoning is that more 
capacity associated with a more professional organization and staff in the IT areas will result in 
better performance (also) in transparency matters. Closely related to administrative capacity is 
local government financial autonomy. Having a larger proportion of the local budget derived 
from own sources enhances local government ability to exercise transparency policy choices 
and is likely to stimulate accountability towards local taxpayers. In contrast, local governments 
heavily reliant on intergovernmental transfers will experience less flexibility to deploy 
transparency procedures and less pressure to be transparent (Geys, Heinemann, & Kalb, 2010).   
Based on these empirical findings and theoretical stances, we derive another set of hypotheses 
related to the context of supply-side features that impact on transparency: 
H4: Higher electoral competition at the local level increases transparency 
H5: The number of consecutive terms in power is negatively associated with the level of 
transparency 
H6: Minority executives display higher levels of transparency 
H7: Left or center-left municipal executives are associated with higher levels of transparency  
H8: The degree of financial autonomy of the municipality is positively associated with the level 
of transparency 
H9: IT capacity is positively associated with the level of transparency 
The characteristics of the municipal executive and the mayor’s profile influence the adoption of 
transparency measures, but this is not a one-way process. The members of the community itself 
play a role as stakeholders in lobbying for transparency in local government. The next section 
explores the demand-side hypotheses. 
 
3.2. Demand-side determinants 
In their study, Yavuz and Welch (2014) find that the influence of civil society and the 
willingness of citizens to participate in agency decision-making are both positive predictors of 
increased openness of government websites. Our work begins to unpack these concepts by 
looking at the influence of the socioeconomic and demographic profile of the communities as 
determinants of transparency. The expected positive effects of transparency, such as improved 
accountability, increased trust in government, and the reduction of risks of corruption, can only 
be captured if citizens are able to acquire and process information (Murillo, 2015). This effect is 
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known as the publicity condition (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009) and its effectiveness is largely 
dependent on the socioeconomic status (SES) of the community.    
Rosenstone and Hasen (1993) suggest that individuals of higher SES are more politically active. 
Education, income and occupation are crucial descriptors of a community’s SES. Yang and 
Callahan (2007) find that communities with higher education levels are also more likely to get 
involved in strategic decision making in local government. Self-selection is an important 
mechanism to induce an active demand for transparency and wealth, education, and special 
interests and preferences are likely to operate as drivers of information disclosure (Fiorina, 
1999; Fung, 2006). Akin to education, higher levels of wealth and employment in the 
municipality should be associated with higher levels of local government transparency. Indeed, 
recent work by Caamaño-Alegre et al. (2013) analyzes the determinants of budget transparency 
in 33 municipalities in the Spanish province of Galizia and finds a negative relationship 
between unemployment and budget transparency. Lowatcharin and Menifield (2015) investigate 
the role of geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional factors on governmental 
transparency in 816 out of 1055 counties in the twelve Midwestern U.S. states find that 
education attainment and per capita income levels are associated with higher levels of county 
government transparency. 
Piotrowski and Bertelli (2010) developed a municipal transparency index using item response 
theory and tested the determinants using data from questionnaires administered to all 566 
municipal clerks in New Jersey (67% response rate). They find that local governments with 
younger, college educated respondents display higher levels of transparency. In contrast, earlier 
empirical work conducted by Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) finds a positive relationship 
between age and support for higher levels of transparency, although this relationship is reversed 
for documents obtained from the administration. Because our measure of transparency relies on 
information disclosed on municipal websites, we should expect similar results to the ones 
obtained by Piotrowski and Bertelli (2010). 
Population size is also expected to have a positive effect on the levels of transparency. First, all 
else being equal, the total number of people interested in government transparency should 
naturally increase with the total population. Second, with size also comes relevance and 
prominence in the national and international settings which, among other effects, should 
increase scrutiny (by the media and citizens in general). Styles and Tennyson (2007) investigate 
and find a positive effect of the size of 300 American municipalities on the availability and 
accessibility of local government financial reports on the internet. Christiaens (1999) finds a 
similar relationship in a study of the level of compliance with regulation requiring information 
disclosure of accounting practices by municipalities in Flanders. In their comparative study of 
municipalities in Portugal and Italy, Jorge et al. (2011) also find a positive relationship between 
population size and fiscal transparency. Serrano-Cinca et al. (2009) reach a similar conclusion 
for the relationship between size and voluntary internet financial reporting (e-disclosure). 
Finally, a recent study by Albalate del Sol (2013) reports a positive association between a 
jurisdiction size and his estimate of local government transparency in Spain. 
The Political Science literature suggests that voter turnout levels, the frequency of contacts 
between citizens and local officials, and participation in political meetings can all be regarded as 
indicators of citizen involvement and commitment to participation in political matters (Oliver, 
2001; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007). In line with this, the study by Albalate del Sol (2013) 
tests and confirms a positive association between voter turnout and levels of transparency. 
9 
Based on these “demand-side” considerations, we formulate the final set of hypotheses 
regarding the local community context and the levels of transparency attained by the various 
municipalities: 
H10: Communities with higher socioeconomic status display higher levels of transparency 
H11: Municipalities where the average age of the population is higher display lower levels of 
transparency 
H12: Population size is positively associated with the level of transparency 
H13: Higher voter turnout in mayoral elections is positively associated with higher levels of 
transparency 
 
For a summary of all supply-side and demand-side hypotheses included in the current research 
and the corresponding supporting literature, please see Table 1. Again, the limited empirical 
work conducted to this date due to the unavailability of effective ‘transparency measures’ is 
fairly evident (given the lack of empirical evidence for a few of the hypotheses, some of the 
references correspond to theoretical arguments). 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of research hypotheses and supporting literature. 
Hypothesis References 
H1: Municipalities headed by younger mayors are more 
likely to present higher levels of transparency 
Piotrowski & Van Ryzin (2007) 
H2: Municipalities led by mayors with higher education 
display higher levels of transparency 
Dreher et al. (2009) 
H3: Municipalities with female mayors display higher 
levels of transparency 
Eagly & John (1990), Piotrowski & Van Ryzin (2007), 
Sjöberg (2010) 
H4: Higher electoral competition at the local level 
increases transparency; H5: The number of consecutive 
terms in power is negatively associated with the level of 
transparency; and H6: Minority executives display 
higher levels of transparency 
Oliver (2001), Gandia & Archidona (2008), Thomas 
(2010), Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero (2012), 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012), Wehner & De 
Renzio (2013), Berliner (2014), Harrison & Sayogo 
(2014) 
H7: Left or center-left municipal executives are 
associated with higher levels of transparency 
Piotrowski & Van Ryzin (2007), Albalate de Sol (2013) 
H8: The degree of financial autonomy of the 
municipality is positively associated with the level of 
transparency 
Geys et al. (2010) 
H9: IT capacity is positively associated with the level of 
transparency 
Yavuz & Welch (2014) 
H10: Communities with higher socioeconomic status 
display higher levels of transparency 
Rosenstone & Hasen (1993), Fiorina (1999), Fung 
(2006), Yang & Callahan (2007), Caamaño-Alegre et al. 
(2013), Lowatcharin, G. & Menifield (2015) 
H11: Municipalities where the average age of the 
population is higher display lower levels of transparency 
Piotrowski & Bertelli (2010) 
H12: Population size is positively associated with the 
level of transparency 
Christiaens (1999), Styles & Tennyson (2007), Serrano-
Cinca et al. (2009), Jorge et al. (2011), Albalate de Sol 
(2013) 
H13: Higher voter turnout in mayoral elections is 
positively associated with higher levels of transparency 
Oliver (2001), Piotrowski & Van Ryzin (2007), Albalate 
de Sol (2013) 
 
 
10 
4. Research context 
Local governments in Portugal have a long tradition dating back to the Middle Ages, but local 
democracy is recent, since mayoral elections with party lists and universal suffrage occurred for 
the first time in 1976, two years after democracy was reinstated. Many local governments in 
Portugal have undergone significant modernization changes over the past decade that promoted 
extensive New Public Management-type reforms, particularly in more urban areas (Tavares & 
Camões, 2007 and 2010). Local executives are headed by elected, professional, full-time 
mayors (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). The literature is unanimous in indicating that Portugal 
accompanies Greece, Austria, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland in the group of countries 
following a strong mayor tradition (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006; Magre & Bertrana, 2007), where 
the mayor represents the interests of the community in face of higher levels of government 
(Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006).   
Mayors in Portugal are elected as heads of their party’s or civic/independent movement’s list 
and the members of the municipal executive are divided up using the d’Hondt proportional 
formula (Magre & Bertrana, 2007). As a result of proportional representation, local executives 
can be minority executives, meaning that the winning party (and the mayor in office) does not 
hold the majority of seats in the cabinet. As argued above, this is likely to create political 
pressure and increased demands by the opposition and contribute to a higher level of 
commitment to transparency by the local executive. Mayors heading minority executives face 
more situations where negotiation skills and ability to compromise are required to convince 
members of the executive from other parties to support the policies proposed by the mayor. A 
stronger opposition and a weakened legitimacy of the Mayor’s list may require the government 
to adhere to more transparent practices. 
 
4.1. The Portuguese municipal transparency index 
The MTI was developed in 2013 by Transparência e Integridade, Associação Cívica (TIAC), the 
national representative of TI, in cooperation with four Portuguese academic institutions. The 
objective was to assess the level of transparency of local governments through the scrutiny of 
the information that is disclosed online in the official websites of the municipalities. The index 
does not take into account the accessibility, intelligibility, reliability, and quality of the 
information. It merely accounts for the disclosure/non-disclosure of a set of information items, 
where the impact of disclosure/non-disclosure in the overall score depends of the type of 
information item. Therefore, the abovementioned definition that construes transparency as the 
online publicity of all the acts of government and their representatives is compatible with the 
MTI model. The Portuguese MTI was modelled through a Multicriteria Decision Analysis 
approach (Munda, 2004). The process and methods used to develop this index are thoroughly 
described in da Cruz et al. (2016). Nevertheless, the main features of the MTI – which makes it 
one of the most robust transparency assessment tools available to date – are summarized below. 
The index includes 76 indicators consisting of dummy variables that take the value of ‘1’ when 
a certain information item is available in the municipality official website (and ‘0’ otherwise). 
These indicators are grouped in seven dimensions: A) Organizational information, social 
composition, and operation of the municipality (executive and deliberative bodies) (18 
indicators); B) Plans and planning (13 indicators); C) Local taxes, rates, service charges, and 
regulations (5 indicators); D) Relationship with citizens as customers (8 indicators); E) Public 
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procurement (10 indicators); F) Economic and financial transparency (12 indicators); and G) 
Urban planning and land use management (10 indicators). All indicators and dimensions were 
selected/designated through face-to-face participatory processes involving public administration 
practitioners, academics, and civic activists (for a full list of indicators, see the Appendix). 
The rules for scoring in each dimension and the respective weights were also established in a 
participatory workshop. During this session the group of stakeholders decided to use the same 
system to score the level of transparency in each dimension. This fairly simple scoring 
mechanism is presented in Table 2. As can easily be seen in the table below, the scheme is 
based on the share of “determinant” and “important” information items available online. 
Therefore, the group of experts was asked to identify the “determinant” indicators in each 
dimension (up to a quarter of the total, approximately). This allows for a more meticulous 
assessment since the scoring system for the MTI dimensions gives an extra reward to the 
disclosure of these items of information (i.e. not all indicators are valued the same, emphasis is 
given to some – the ‘determinant’ indicators).  
 
Table 2. Rules for scoring in each dimension of the MTI. Source: da Cruz et al. (2016). 
Performance 
level 
Scoring rule Score 
Level I All information is disclosed. 100 
Level II All ‘Determinant’ information and more than 50% of the ‘Important’ information. 93 
Level III All ‘Determinant’ information and between 25% and 50% of the ‘Important’ information. 86 
Level IV All ‘Determinant’ information and less than 25% of the ‘Important’ information. 79 
Level V 
More than 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and more than 50% of the ‘Important’ 
information. 
71 
Level VI 
More than 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and between 25% and 50% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
64 
Level VII 
More than 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and less than 25% of the ‘Important’ 
information. 
57 
Level VIII 
Between 25% and 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and more than 50% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
50 
Level IX 
Between 25% and 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and between 25% and 50% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
43 
Level X 
Between 25% and 50% of the ‘Determinant’ information and less than 25% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
36 
Level XI 
Less than 25% of the ‘Determinant’ information and more than 50% of the ‘Important’ 
information. 
29 
Level XII 
Less than 25% of the ‘Determinant’ information and between 25% and 50% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
21 
Level XIII 
Less than 25% of the ‘Determinant’ information and between 10% and 25% of the 
‘Important’ information. 
14 
Level XIV 
Less than 25% of the ‘Determinant’ information and less than 10% of the ‘Important’ 
information (but at least one item is disclosed). 
7 
Level XV No information is disclosed. 0 
 
After reaching an agreement on the system to assess performance in each dimension of 
transparency, it was necessary to determine the weighting coefficients that would allow to 
estimate the ‘overall transparency’. The weights were computed through an iterative process 
where several questions were posed to the group of stakeholders. In simple terms, the 
participants had to express their preferences when comparing different “transparency profiles”, 
that is, fictitious municipalities with different scores in the various transparency dimensions (for 
methodological detail on weighting, please refer to da Cruz et al., 2016).  The results of this 
procedure are presented in Figure 1. The weighting coefficients were then used to aggregate the 
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scores achieved by the municipalities in each dimension (i.e. to compute the overall MTI score) 
according to the following formula: 
     


n
j
ijji mDwmMTI
1
 with 


n
j
jw
1
1  and 0jw  (1) 
where MTI(mi) is the MTI score of municipality mi, Dj(mi) is the score of the municipality in 
dimension j, and wj is the weighting coefficient of dimension j. Obviously, by design, both the 
overall MTI and the scores of the dimensions will range from “0” (totally opaque) to “100” 
(totally transparent).
1
 
 
 
Figure 1. Weights of MTI’s dimensions. Source: da Cruz et al. (2016). 
 
4.2. Data and methods 
Data for the MTI was collected during the first half of 2013. A group of students was selected 
by TIAC and given specific instructions on how to code each of the 76 indicators included in 
the MTI. All members of the coding team could contact the lead researcher of the project with 
questions and doubts regarding the coding and these instructions were compiled into a list of 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to provide guidance for future replications of the MTI. 
After data collection, the preliminary results were sent to all municipalities in August 2013 
(local governments were given 10 days to send back their suggestions/corrections). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to estimate the models using the 2013 
MTI as the dependent variable. The full model specification employs two sets of variables: 
supply-side determinants (the mayor’s profile and institutional and political factors) and 
demand-side determinants (socioeconomic factors).  
                                                          
1
 Note that the “0” to “100” range was arbitrarily chosen by the decision making group during the 
workshop. Any other numerical scale could have been adopted instead with no implications for the 
robustness of the assessment model. 
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To gauge the effects of using a multicriteria model defined through a participatory and iterative 
process, we also estimate the regression models using equal weights for the seven dimensions of 
transparency (instead of the weights shown in Figure 1), and equal weights for the 76 
underlying indicators (i.e. 1/76 or approximately 0.013). In practical terms, assuming equal 
weights for all dimensions means that the same score in two different dimensions will have 
exactly the same contribution for the overall transparency score. This will be the case 
irrespective of number of indicators contained by each dimension and the actual “relevance” of 
those indicators for overall municipal transparency (e.g. achieving a Level II in dimension G 
“Urban planning and land use management” is exactly the same as achieving a Level II in, say, 
dimension D “Relationship with citizens as customers”). 
Similarly, adopting equal weights for all indicators bears the assumption that disclosing/non-
disclosing an information item has always the same impact on overall transparency, irrespective 
of the content or type of information in question. This would mean, for example, that disclosing 
the “annual budget” (a determinant indicator of dimension F “Economic and financial 
transparency”) has the same value of disclosing “links to active social networks” (an indicator 
of dimension D “Relationship with citizens as customers”) which, again, may be a strong 
assumption to impose to such an assessment model. 
Both simplifications (equal weights for dimensions or equal weights for indicators) have 
obvious problems.
2
 In fact, these theoretical limitations were the main reason that led the MTI 
research team to adopt a Multicriteria Decision Analysis modelling approach. What we are 
trying to unveil by using these two additional municipal transparency estimators is whether the 
extra complexity and time-consuming efforts involved with this type of modelling are worth it 
when the ultimate objective is to study the determinants of local government transparency.
3
 
Testing these different estimators also allow us to perform some sort of robustness analysis. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in the regression models. 
As can be noted, the average value of the MTI for the mainland municipalities is quite low (the 
municipalities from the islands were excluded from the analysis due to lack of data for the 
independent variables). This was somewhat expected because the 2013 MTI was the first ever 
large-scale and widely disseminated assessment of local government transparency in Portugal. 
In fact, there was an agreement among all the stakeholders involved in the modelling procedure 
that the current transparency practices are below acceptable levels in most municipalities (a 
score of 36 was set as the “acceptable” threshold for the MTI, which, for example, corresponds 
to achieving Level X in all dimensions; the threshold for a “good” level of transparency 
correspond to a score of 64). 
We include three variables describing the mayor’s profile on the right-hand side of the 
regression equation: a dummy variable of the mayor’s gender (1=Female), the mayor’s age, and 
the mayor’s education. This variable uses a scale where 0=6 years of formal education or less, 
1=9 years of formal education, 2=Complete high school, 3=Complete undergraduate degree, 
                                                          
2
 Note that adopting equal weights is just one among an infinite number of possible cases that can be the 
result of “arbitrary weighting”. Any attempt to reflect the “importance” of a dimension/indicator without 
considering the range of possible impacts for the remaining dimensions/indicators is theoretically 
incorrect. 
3
 However, the “worth” of this type of modelling is quite evident if the objective is instead to carry out 
advocacy, raise the awareness of citizens and local governments and promote reforms or more transparent 
practices. An assessment model with embedded problems and theoretical limitations can be easily 
discredited by the subjects being evaluated and/or lead to unfair or perverse results. 
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and 4=Postgraduate degree. These variables were obtained via a telephone survey of the mayors 
of all 278 municipalities of Continental Portugal conducted between October and December 
2011 by the Center for Research in Public Policy and Administration. 
We employ the margin of victory to account for the level of electoral competition. This measure 
is the difference in percentage points between the winner and the runner up in each mayoral 
election race in 2009. The number of consecutive terms by the incumbent in 2009 is used to test 
the hypothesis that lengthier stays in office depress transparency levels. A dummy variable 
controls for the presence of a minority executive. Partisanship is a dummy variable that equals 1 
when the mayor belongs to a party on the left of the Portuguese political spectrum (Socialist 
Party, Communist Party or Left Bloc) and equals 0 otherwise. These variables are available at 
the National Election Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) (http://eleicoes.cne.pt).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Indicator Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Dependent       
Transparency MTI 2013 32.31 10.41 0.00 60.99 278 
Transparency All transparency dimensions valued the same 
(i.e. dimensions with equal weights) (2013) 
32.48 10.23 0.00 61.22 278 
Transparency All indicators valued the same (i.e. indicators 
with equal weights) (2013) 
29.44 10.75 0.00 57.89 278 
Supply-side       
Minority 
executive 
1=Minority executive; 0=Otherwise (2009) 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 278 
Consecutive 
terms 
Number of consecutive terms by the 
incumbent (2009) 
3.07 1.96 1.00 10.00 278 
Margin of 
victory 
Difference in percentage points between 1st 
and 2nd place parties (2009) 
20.02 10.98 0.95 56.64 278 
Partisanship Left=1; 0=Otherwise (2009) 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 278 
Financial 
autonomy 
Proportion of own revenues 0.34 0.19 0.04 0.87 278 
IT employees Natural log of IT employees in City Hall 1.30 0.86 0.00 4.93 236 
Gender Mayor’s gender (1=Female) 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 278 
Mayor’s age Mayor’s age 52.02 8.61 27.00 74.00 270 
Mayor’s 
education 
 (0=6 years or less; 1=9 years; 2=High 
school; 3=Graduate; 4=Postgraduate  
1.97 .68 0.00 4.00 220 
Demand-Side       
Education Proportion of individuals w/ a Bachelor’s 
degree 
0.08 0.04 0.03 0.27 278 
Unemployment Percent unemployed 12.50 2.83 5.09 22.85 278 
Age Average age of municipal population 41.55 3.89 32.5 52.71 278 
Purchase power Index (100=Country average) 76.03 24.26 47.36 232.54 278 
Turnout Turnout in mayoral elections (2009) 65.06 7.37 45.91 80.61 278 
Municipal 
population 
Natural log 9.83 1.10 7.48 13.14 278 
Note: All variables are measured in 2011, except where mentioned otherwise. 
 
Financial autonomy is gauged by the proportion of total revenues generated within each 
community (local taxes, fees, and other municipal charges) and was made available by the 
General Directorate of Local Governments (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais). 
Administrative capacity is assessed by the number of Information Technology employees in the 
City Hall. This variable was obtained via the telephone survey mentioned above and is used in 
natural log form to uphold the normality assumption. 
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Lastly, we include six demand-side variables: the proportion of individuals with a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher, purchasing power index, unemployment rate per municipality in 2011, average 
age of municipal population, voter turnout in the 2009 mayoral elections, and population size 
(in natural log form). Three of these variables are employed to assess the positive association 
between socioeconomic status and transparency (hypothesis 10): Education, Employment and 
Purchase Power. All variables are reported in the 2011 Census with the exception of the 
purchasing power index elaborated by PORDATA (http://www.pordata.pt), and voter turnout 
obtained at the National Election Commission. 
 
4.3. Findings 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the findings for several specifications of Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions (using as dependent variable the MTI 2013, the score obtained when all dimensions 
have the same weight, and the score obtained when all indicators have the same weight, 
respectively). The first model (1) includes only the supply-side variables (except IT employees 
and the mayor’s characteristics), the second (2) includes only the demand-side variables, and 
model (3) is the full specification (except IT employees and the mayor’s characteristics). These 
three specifications use data for all 278 municipalities of Continental Portugal. For the 
remaining four models, each one includes the full specification plus additional variables for 
which we do not have data for all the municipalities, namely: IT employees (4), the mayor’s 
gender (5), the mayor’s gender and age (6), and the mayor’s gender and education (7). With 
very few exceptions, the results are basically the same in all models. Globally, the signs of the 
coefficients are almost always as theoretically expected (but there are exceptions) and their 
magnitudes and standard errors are consistent between specifications.  
Curiously, the “dimensions with equal weights” models present slightly more statistically 
significant coefficients than the MTI 2013 ones, whereas the “indicators with equal weights” 
depict slightly less. However, and more importantly, the regression results are consistent across 
the three dependent variables tested (i.e. coefficients have the same sign and even similar 
magnitudes in all specifications), which is indicative of the robustness of the results attained. In 
the end, it seems that capturing the perceptions of a group of experts to model the scoring 
systems and weights of the criteria (be it “dimensions” or “indicators”) is not crucial if the sole 
objective is to explore the determinants of local government transparency. However, if 
resources are available, it is preferable to frame the findings around the more theoretically-
sound scores that have embedded the preferences of a legitimate group of experts (in our case, 
the MTI). Although all models are imperfect representations of the reality, the MTI should still 
be closer to that unattainable reality than any arbitrary assessment model. 
The profile of the mayor contributes to explain the varying levels of transparency found on the 
websites of Portuguese municipalities. The three variables included to account for the mayor’s 
profile display the expected signs, but only one – the mayor’s gender – is statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Municipalities run by female mayors have, on average, MTI scores five 
points above their male counterparts. This is a substantive impact.  
 
Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Estimations (Dependent Variable: MTI 2103) 
 Supply-side Demand- Full Full model Full Full Full model 
16 
model 
(1) 
side model 
(2) 
model 
(3) 
(w/ IT 
employees) 
(4) 
model (w/ 
mayor’s 
gender) 
(5) 
model (w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
age) 
(6) 
(w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
education) 
(7) 
Supply-side        
Minority 
executive 
1.02 
(1.56) 
----- 0.41 
(1.62) 
-0.02 
(1.75) 
-0.13 
(1.69) 
0.37 
(1.7) 
0.8 
(1.94) 
Consecutive 
terms 
-0.87 
(0.32)*** 
----- -0.96 
(0.31)*** 
-0.82 
(0.31)*** 
-0.93 
(0.31)*** 
-0.90 
(0.37)** 
-0.64 
(0.35)* 
Margin of 
victory 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
----- 0.12 
(0.06)** 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Partisanship 0.78 
(1.14) 
----- 1.19 
(1.14) 
1.14 
(1.17) 
1.07 
(1.13) 
0.87 
(1.14) 
0.1 
(1.27) 
Financial 
autonomy 
22.18 
(3.20)*** 
----- 10.61 
(5.18)** 
8.86 
(5.34)* 
9.9 
(5.16)* 
9.21 
(5.13)* 
11.89 
(5.07)** 
IT employees ----- ----- ----- 0.5 (1.13) ----- ----- ----- 
Gender ----- ----- ----- ----- 4.78 
(2.48)* 
5.12 
(2.5)** 
5.77 
(2.66)** 
Mayor’s age ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.01 
(0.09) 
----- 
Mayor’s 
education 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 1.11 
(1.04) 
Demand-side        
Education ----- 18.73 
(33.41) 
35.18 
(33.84) 
57.89 
(37.77) 
40.38 
(34.15) 
30.11 
(36.57) 
4.51 
(41.89) 
Unemployment ----- -0.48 
(0.22)** 
-0.46 
(0.21)** 
-0.33 
(0.2) 
-0.46 
(0.21)** 
-0.42 
(0.21)* 
-0.43 
(0.24)* 
Age ----- -0.41 
(0.24)* 
-0.33 
(0.23) 
-0.39 
(0.25) 
-0.39 
(0.23)* 
-0.4 
(0.24)* 
-0.43 
(0.26) 
Purchasing 
power 
----- 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
Turnout ----- -0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
Municipal 
population 
----- 0.81 
(0.98) 
0.6 
(0.97) 
 
0.6 
(1.18) 
0.49 
(0.96) 
0.48 
(1) 
0.07 
(1.13) 
Constant 24.33 
(1.97)*** 
45.79 
(20.91)** 
39.67 
(21.16)* 
43.12 
(23.34)* 
42.63 
(20.48)** 
42.43 
(21.38)** 
47.4 
(22.84)** 
F 
R2  
11.76*** 
0.18 
10.66 
0.18 
7.56*** 
0.23 
6.54*** 
0.24 
7.73*** 
0.24 
6.26*** 
0.22 
5.14*** 
0.22 
N. Obs. 278 278 278 236 278 270 220 
 
The results indicate that there is a negative effect of the number of consecutive terms on the 
level of local government transparency. Each additional term is associated with a drop in about 
0.9 percentage points (for the full model) in the level of transparency. Lengthier stays in power 
are detrimental to the adoption of information disclosure and open government principles. 
Also on the “supply side”, larger margins of victory are an indication of lower levels of 
competition in local elections and, according to our findings, municipalities where the 
difference between the winner and runner-up are larger also display higher scores in the MTI. 
This result fails to support the argument that competitive elections provide additional pressure 
to increase transparency and accountability towards citizens. Instead, this finding seems to 
indicate that, all else being equal, more comfortable margins of victory allow municipal 
executives to adopt transparency practices without too much concern over electoral outcomes. 
Unlike financial autonomy, which seems to be a key requirement for higher levels of 
transparency, political ideology and the existence of minority executives have an undetermined 
association (or perhaps no association at all) with local government transparency practices. 
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Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Estimations (Dependent Variable: dimensions with equal weights) 
 Supply-side 
model 
(1) 
Demand- 
side model 
(2) 
Full 
model 
(3) 
Full model 
(w/ IT 
employees) 
(4) 
Full 
model (w/ 
mayor’s 
gender) 
(5) 
Full 
model (w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
age) 
(6) 
Full 
model (w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
education) 
(7) 
Supply-side        
Minority 
executive 
0.98 
(1.54) 
----- 0.32 
(1.58) 
-0.07 
(1.74) 
-0.17 
(1.63) 
0.24 
(1.64) 
0.87 
(1.88) 
Consecutive 
terms 
-0.80 
(0.28)*** 
----- -0.9 
(0.27)*** 
-0.78 
(0.28)*** 
-0.88 
(0.27)*** 
-0.86 
(0.33)** 
-0.7 
(0.31)** 
Margin of 
victory 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
----- 0.12 
(0.06)** 
0.1 
(0.06)* 
0.12 
(0.06)** 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
0.12 
(0.07)* 
Partisanship 0.63 
(1.09) 
----- 1.09 
(1.07) 
0.73 
(1.09) 
0.98 
(1.06) 
0.75 
(1.07) 
-0.07 
(1.19) 
Financial 
autonomy 
24.16 
(3.05)*** 
----- 11.31 
(5)** 
9.81 
(5.1)* 
10.65 
(4.99)** 
9.83 
(4.99)* 
11.46 
(5.09)** 
IT employees ----- ----- ----- 1.1 
(1.03) 
----- ----- ----- 
Gender ----- ----- ----- ----- 4.39 
(2.2)** 
4.74 
(2.21)** 
5.68 
(2.34)** 
Mayor’s age ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.01 
(0.09) 
----- 
Mayor’s 
education 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.74 
(0.96) 
Demand-side        
Education ----- 25.84 
(33.47) 
42.17 
(33.42) 
70.77 
(36.98)* 
46.94 
(33.74) 
41.03 
(36.76) 
19.7 
(41.32) 
Unemployment ----- -0.46 
(0.21)** 
-0.44 
(0.2)** 
-0.33 
(0.19)* 
-0.44 
(0.2)** 
-0.4 
(0.2)** 
-0.41 
(0.23)* 
Age ----- -0.48 
(0.22)** 
-0.39 
(0.21)* 
-0.46 
(0.23)** 
-0.44 
(0.21)** 
-0.47 
(0.22)** 
-0.49 
(0.24)** 
Purchasing 
power 
----- 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Turnout ----- -0.84 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
Municipal 
population 
----- 1.07 
(0.93) 
0.85 
(0.92) 
0.61 
(1.08) 
0.74 
(0.92) 
0.64 
(0.96) 
0.22 
(1.08) 
Constant 23.78 
(1.85)*** 
46.26 
(19.14)** 
39.4 
(18.91)** 
45.09 
(20.6)** 
42.12 
(18.4)** 
43.87 
(19.32)** 
49.81 
(20.64)** 
F 
R2  
14.20*** 
0.21 
15.13*** 
0.22 
9.56*** 
0.27 
8.65*** 
0.29 
9.70*** 
0.28 
7.96*** 
0.26 
6.45*** 
0.26 
N. Obs. 278 278 278 236 278 270 220 
 
Finally, several results on the demand-side deserve mention. Previously, we argued that higher 
unemployment rates and lower economic development at the local level have been associated 
with lower civic engagement and demand for opportunities to participate in local government 
decisions. Indeed, we find that municipalities with higher unemployment rates have lower 
transparency scores: on average, a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
drops the MTI by around 0.3 points. The average age of municipal population is also negatively 
associated with transparency. As expected, the coefficient for our education variable is positive 
throughout all specifications (with the single exception of the full model with mayor’s gender 
and education, using indicators with equal weights as the dependent variable), but fails to reach 
statistical significance at conventional levels in all models. Surprisingly, our analysis was not 
able to capture any significant associations between population size, purchasing power and 
voter turnout – all expected to bestow a positive influence – and transparency scores. 
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Estimations (Dependent Variable: indicators with equal weights) 
 Supply-
side model 
(1) 
Demand- 
side model 
(2) 
Full model 
(3) 
Full model 
(w/ IT 
employees) 
(4) 
Full model 
(w/ 
mayor’s 
gender) 
(5) 
Full model 
(w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
age) 
(6) 
Full model 
(w/ 
mayor’s 
gender & 
education) 
(7) 
Supply-side        
Minority 
executive 
2.50 
(1.72) 
----- 1.79 
(1.74) 
1.16 
(1.9) 
1.38 
(1.76) 
1.61 
(1.78) 
2.77 
(2.07) 
Consecutive 
terms 
-0.77 
(0.29)*** 
----- -0.88 
(0.29)*** 
-0.75 
(0.29)** 
-0.86 
(0.28)*** 
-0.88 
(0.34)** 
-0.6 
(0.31)* 
Margin of 
victory 
0.10 
(0.06)* 
----- 0.09 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
Partisanship 1.15 
(1.17) 
----- 1.54 
(1.14) 
1.4 
(1.16) 
1.45 
(1.14) 
1.37 
(1.16) 
0.69 
(1.28) 
Financial 
autonomy 
24.84 
(3.14)*** 
----- 10.39 
(5.45)* 
8.32 
(5.5) 
9.84 
(5.42)* 
9.44 
(5.44)* 
11.09 
(5.38)** 
IT employees ----- ----- ----- 0.72 
(1.14) 
----- ----- ----- 
Gender ----- ----- ----- ----- 3.67 
(2.35) 
3.97 
(2.35)* 
4.79 
(2.55)* 
Mayor’s age ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.03 
(0.09) 
----- 
Mayor’s 
education 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.51 
(0.97) 
Demand-side        
Education ----- 8.65 
(34.68) 
24.01 
(34.52) 
42.8 
(38.21) 
27.99 
(34.97) 
26.67 
(38.09) 
-1.35 
(42.37) 
Unemployment ----- -0.37 
(0.22)* 
-0.38 
(0.21)* 
-0.27 
(0.21) 
-0.38 
(0.22)* 
-0.35 
(0.22) 
-0.32 
(0.25) 
Age ----- -0.41 
(0.22)* 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.41 
(0.23)* 
-0.39 
(0.21)* 
-0.42 
(0.22)* 
-0.40 
(0.24)* 
Purchasing 
power 
----- 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Turnout ----- -0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.05 
(0.1) 
-0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.03 
(0.1) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
Municipal 
population 
----- 1.87 
(0.98)* 
1.58 
(0.98) 
1.63 
(1.14) 
1.50 
(0.98) 
1.36 
(1.01) 
1.07 
(1.16) 
Constant 20.66 
(1.99)*** 
31.06 
(20) 
28.09 
(20.58) 
32.36 
(21.81) 
30.37 
(20.34) 
32.1 
(21.26) 
34.78 
(22.97) 
F 
R2  
14.43*** 
0.21 
15.65 
0.22 
9.69*** 
0.26 
9.00*** 
0.29 
9.59*** 
0.27 
7.94*** 
0.25 
6.26*** 
0.25 
N. Obs. 278 278 278 236 278 270 220 
 
Overall, variables on the demand-side perform significantly worse in explaning municipal 
transparency than the supply-side ones. Our results suggest that local government transparency 
in Portugal is primarily associated to characteristics of the local governments and elected 
leaders themselves rather than by pressures associated with the socioeconomic and demographic 
profiles of citizens and communities. This pattern of results seems to be consistent with the 
strong mayor model characterizing the Portuguese local government system and suggests the 
possibility of extending these conclusions to other countries where a similar model prevails. The 
notional lack of interest of the Portuguese population on (local) public/political matters seems to 
find some empirical support in this study. 
 
5. Conclusions and future research 
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This paper contributes to this body of knowledge by investigating the determinants of local 
government transparency. We test a series of hypotheses derived from a (supply and demand) 
political market framework using data from the websites of all 278 municipalities of Continental 
Portugal. Our findings concur with empirical work by Ruano de la Fuente (2014) suggesting an 
uneven use of ICTs by local governments to enhance transparency. The single most relevant 
individual factor contributing to higher levels of transparency is gender. We were able to 
confirm our third hypothesis that female mayors are associated with higher levels of 
transparency when compared to their male counterparts. Given that the overwhelming majority 
of Portuguese mayors are male, this finding also helps explaining the overall low levels of 
municipal transparency. The findings concerning other individual characteristics of the mayors 
are slightly disappointing. Our first two hypotheses did not receive support in this analysis: the 
age and level of education of Portuguese mayors do not appear to predict the variation in the 
levels of local government transparency.       
A crucial conclusion of this research is that the extended stay in power of municipal executives 
is a key factor undermining local government transparency. The number of consecutive terms 
served by an incumbent reduces the pressure to disclose information and compromises 
transparency. This finding confirms H5 and is consistent with prior findings indicating that 
turnover in the executive office is associated with increased transparency expressed by the 
adoption of Freedom of Information laws (Berliner, 2014). However, our analysis fails to 
support H4 and the idea that strong and credible opposition is likely to increase levels of 
transparency (due to increased political pressure over the local executive). In fact, we find the 
exact opposite: controlling for the number of consecutive terms served by an incumbent, larger 
margins of victory are associated with higher levels of transparency. This points to the idea 
previously expressed by John and Cole (1990) that lower competition allows local officials to 
engage in experimentation without risking reelection bids. Furthermore, if local executives have 
to spend less time and energy in dealing with opposition, they may be more willing to produce 
and disclose useful government information. 
The results also confirm H8. Substantively, financial autonomy is the most important driver of 
transparency, with more autonomous local governments capable of delivering higher levels of 
transparency online and more concerned with accountability to their citizens. In contrast, the 
expected positive effects of minority executives (H6), left-wing partisanship (H7), and IT 
capacity (H9) are not confirmed in our empirical analysis. 
In general, the supply-side factors seem to fare much better than the demand-side predictors. 
The results seem to suggest that the low levels of transparency found across the board in 
Portuguese local governments may also be due to insufficient demand driven by cultural and 
educational motives. Only two hypotheses receive some empirical support on the demand-side. 
H10 is partially supported, as municipalities with higher unemployment rates display lower 
levels of transparency. However, the other indicators of SES (education and purchase power) 
fail to achieve statistical significance, despite the expected positive coefficients. Municipalities 
with higher proportions of elderly citizens also display lower levels of transparency, therefore 
providing empirical support for H11. Debates about information disclosure and transparency 
requirements are fairly recent in the national and local media settings and highly popular in 
social media platforms, so perhaps older populations are less informed about these discussions 
and less inclined to follow them. The positive influence of the size of the municipality (H12) 
and voter turnout rates (H13) do not receive empirical support. Overall, our findings suggest 
that a stronger emphasis should be placed in communities with ageing population and where 
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citizens have lower SES, particularly in terms of employment, in order to foster government 
transparency practices, if this is indeed a societal objective. This policy recommendation 
follows prior contributions to the literature with similar orientations in different contexts (Bertot 
et al., 2010; Murillo, 2015). 
This research has some limitations that should be taken into consideration when drawing 
conclusions. First, the findings are based in the analysis of cross-sectional data that does not 
allow for definitive statements of causality. Second, missing data for some of the variables – 
e.g. IT employees and the mayors’ education – creates possible biases in the results. Despite 
these problems, we opted to use these variables in several specifications because their inclusion 
is theoretically sound and supported by prior findings in the literature (Yavuz & Welch, 2014). 
Finally, the MTI itself may be subject to criticism as it measures the presence/absence of 
indicators in official websites, but fails to assess the quality of this information. Faced with time 
and resource constraints, the MTI project (and, consequently, our analysis) values geographical 
coverage and thematic comprehensiveness over depth and detail.   
Overall, the work follows recent trends in the Digital Government literature calling for a 
contextualization of policy-driven electronic governance (Janowski, 2015). The stakeholder-
based participatory approach to select and weight the MTI indicators can be universally 
replicated, but the results are intrinsic to each country (or region, municipality or groups of 
municipalities that engage in a similar exercise). As a result, the MTI has the potential to serve 
as a tool to empower stakeholders in monitoring local government activities and, ultimately, to 
improve accountability and responsiveness of local officials (Janssen & Estevez, 2013; Ruano 
de la Fuente, 2014). 
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Appendix 
Dimensions and indicators of the MTI 
Dimensions Indicators 
Organizational 
information, social 
composition and 
operation of the 
municipality 
 Role and responsibilities of each member of the local council (executive body) 
 Biographical note/CV of each member of the local council 
 Email of each member of the local council 
 Asset declaration of each member of the local council 
 Register of interests of each member of the local council – (“Determinant”) 
 Representation expenses for each member of the  local council 
 List of members of the Mayor’s cabinet and full time aldermen and respective remuneration – 
(“Determinant”) 
 Employees annual report (“social balance sheet”) 
 List of employees authorized to accumulate public and private duties (including the term and respective 
entities) – (“Determinant”) 
 Job vacancies and recruitment notices 
 Outsourcing and consulting service contracts (types and amounts) 
 Recruitment process documents (jury, list of accepted and rejected applicants, evaluation criteria) – 
(“Determinant”) 
 General information about the competences of the local council and municipal assembly (deliberative 
body) 
 Code of ethics for municipal officers 
 Schedule of both local council and municipal assembly meetings 
 Minutes of local council and municipal assembly meetings for the past two years – (“Determinant”) 
 List of local council and municipal assembly decisions/resolutions 
 General email addresses of the local council, municipal assembly and civil parishes 
Plans and planning  Annual report 
 Sustainability report 
 Compliance report of the Statute governing the Right of Opposition 
 Report on service standards and complaints – (“Determinant”) 
 Strategic plan 
 Local Agenda 21 strategy 
 Municipal public works plan – (“Determinant”) 
 Local environment plan 
 Local waste management plan 
 Local education plan 
 Local emergency plan (civil protection) 
 Local plan for cultural activities  
 Local corruption risk assessment and prevention plan – (“Determinant”) 
Local taxes, rates, 
service charges, and 
regulations 
 Municipal regulations 
 Information on the Quality Management System of municipal services 
 Information on the Local Council Property and Assets – (“Determinant”) 
 Local council newsletter 
 Information on local taxes, fees, tariffs and service charges – (“Determinant”) 
Relationship with 
citizens 
 Search engine of the municipality’s website 
 Links to active social networks 
 Citizen information concerning the interruption and suspension of local services 
 Online Citizen Request and Tracking system  – (“Determinant”) 
 Email or contact details of the municipality’s ombudsman 
 Information about the municipality’s opening hours 
 Information on protocols and decisions/resolutions on subsidies, concessions, and use of local public 
assets – (“Determinant”) 
 Municipality’s Complaints Management System 
Public procurement  Public procurement through non-competitive procedures (suppliers, amounts and justification) – 
(“Determinant”) 
 Public Procurement documents 
 Report of the evaluation of the bids for each public tender 
 Publication of the names of the winning and losing bidders (or consulted entities for other procedures) for 
each contract 
 Publication of the winning bids 
 Contracts signed with the contractors or suppliers – (“Determinant”) 
 Monitoring and/or performance evaluation reports of the supplier/contractor/service provider 
 Number of contracts awarded per supplier/contractor/service provider 
 Amounts of extra works done for each contract 
 Expert opinions, seal of approval and audit reports – (“Determinant”) 
Economic and 
financial 
transparency 
 Annual Budget – (“Determinant”) 
 Balance Sheet 
 Income statement – (“Determinant”) 
 Management report 
 Cash flow statement 
 Budget execution maps (revenue and expenditure) 
 Execution of the multi-year investment plan 
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 Public investment per civil parish 
 Annual budget amendments and rectifications 
 List of amounts payable to suppliers and respective maturities – (“Determinant”) 
 List of bank loans and respective maturities 
 List of debt factoring and other debts to third parties 
Urban planning and 
land use 
management 
 Section with contents on urban planning and land use management in the main page of the website 
 Municipal master development plan and final report– (“Determinant”) 
 Geographic information system (GIS) on land use 
 Urbanization and detailed zoning area plans 
 Results of the public consultation on the municipal territorial plans 
 Status of urban planning report 
 Summary of the opinions of the municipal urban planning services on all real estate and/or changes to 
previously approved or built projects – (“Determinant”) 
 List of land exchanges and sales of the municipality, respective locations and amounts involved 
 Alienable lands previously of public domain, respective values and buyers – (“Determinant”) 
 List of concessions of surface or urban development rights 
 
